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The Banking Union is one of the most important and ambitious pro-
jects launched by the European Union in the last ten years. With su-
pervisory and resolution mechanisms for Eurozone banks now up and 
running, the current narrative is that most of the work to create the 
Banking Union is complete. This paper disputes this view, arguing that 
the persistence of financial protectionism – or “ring-fencing” – at Mem-
ber State level significantly erodes the effectiveness of the Eurozone’s 
single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. It formulates concrete 
recommendations and calls for a political leap of faith from Eurozone 
Member States to cease ring-fencing practices.
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1 Introduction
In the summer of 2012, heads of state and government of the Eurozone asked the 
European Commission to work on the creation of a single supervisory mechanism 
for the European banking system: this was the genesis of the Banking Union1. Since 
then, the concept of the Banking Union has evolved to include, in addition to sin-
gle supervision, a single resolution mechanism and a common deposit insurance 
scheme. While little progress has been made regarding the latter, single supervisory 
and resolution mechanisms for Eurozone banks are now up and running. As a result, 
the consensus is that most of the work has been done in establishing the Banking 
Union and efforts should now focus on creating a deposit insurance scheme.
This paper takes a critical look at this assessment, arguing that the work is far 
from complete on the supervisory and resolution fronts. Indeed, the persistence 
of financial protectionism – or “ring-fencing” – at Member State level significant-
ly erodes the singleness of supervision and resolution, hindering the cross-border 
banking integration and private sector risk-sharing that are essential to the Euro-
zone’s proper functioning. 
The paper first reviews why achieving a fully-fledged Banking Union, in particular 
with regards to single supervision and resolution, should be a priority. It then takes 
a closer look at ring-fencing and its dynamic within Banking Union: what is it, how 
does it run counter to single supervision and resolution, and how does it manifest 
itself in the Eurozone? The last section formulates appropriate recommendations. 
2 Why does the Eurozone need a Banking Union?
Establishing a fully-fledged Banking Union in Europe is a complex endeavor, but 
its raison d’être is simple: to ensure the survival of the Euro. This goal is deeply 
connected to another one, namely breaking the nexus that ties Eurozone banks to 
their sovereign and their domestic economy.
Currencies are a matter of belief: they can only survive insofar as they are credible. To 
be credible, a currency’s value must remain stable over time and across the geograph-
ical area where it is used. In other words, one Euro should be able to roughly buy the 
same good today and in five years – and across all Eurozone countries. For this reason, 
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) main mandate is to target price stability.
However, the ECB cannot achieve price stability on its own; it relies on commercial 
banks to act as transmission channels of its monetary policy to the real economy. 
For these transmission channels to work smoothly, the ECB needs the Eurozone 
financial system to be stable and integrated:
The document may be reproduced in part or in full on the dual condition that its meaning 
is not distorted and that the source is mentioned • The views expressed are those of the au-
thor(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher • The Hertie School cannot be held 
responsible for the use which any third party may make of the document • Original version 
1 Indeed, although the term “Banking Union” appeared later, its inception dates back to the 
Eurozone Summit of June 28 and 29, 2012. In addition to single supervision, Eurozone lead-
ers also stated that the European Stability Mechanism should be able to recapitalize banks 
directly (see here). That idea was later abandoned. 
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•	 A stable financial system is essential, because when commercial banks are 
healthy and trusted to manage citizens’ deposits, they can continue to grant 
loans. Loan creation amounts to (scriptural, non-cash) money creation and is a 
key transmission channel of a central bank’s monetary policy.
•	 An integrated financial system means that capital and liquidity can move freely 
within the Eurozone; in other words, it means a system where there is a high 
degree of private sector risk-sharing and where banks are not only exposed to 
their sovereign state and their domestic economy, but also to other economies. 
Breaking the vicious cycle – often referenced to as a “doom loop” – that binds 
together the weaknesses of a country’s domestic economy, public finances and 
domestic banks is key to the effective transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy 
and the survival of the Euro, for two reasons. First, it ensures that banks devel-
op a more diversified risk profile and a more diversified deposit base, allowing 
them to be more resilient to local shocks. Second, as observed during the crisis, 
when Eurozone countries find themselves caught in the bank-sovereign doom 
loop, uncertainty arises as to whether they have sufficient fiscal resources to 
save their banks. They can quickly lose market access, and pressure mounts to 
regain national control over monetary policy so as to respond properly to the 
crisis, whether this pressure is exerted by speculators or by populist parties at 
home and domestic trends2.
The Banking Union seeks to foster the stability and integration of the Eurozone 
financial system. It rests on three pillars: common supervision to ensure that all 
banks are treated equally no matter which Member State they are in; a common 
resolution framework to make sure banks can be wound down in an orderly way 
at the European level; and common deposit insurance to guarantee that a Euro in 
a deposit in Slovakia is as safe as one in France.
Common supervision and resolution were approved soon and the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism (SSM), with the ECB at its helm, and the Single Resolution Mech-
anism (SRM), with the Single Resolution Board as its central decision-making body, 
are now fully functional. Only the common deposit insurance scheme remains at 
a political standstill. As a result, the assessment usually given is that two-thirds 
of the work has been done (since two of the three pillars have been created). Pol-
icy discussions thus largely prioritize the EDIS and the conditions that need to be 
met financially and politically to create this public sector risk-sharing mechanism. 
However, the assessment that most of the work is complete on the supervision 
and resolution fronts is not accurate. In reality, the SSM and SRM cannot fully meet 
their mandates, because Eurozone Member States retain the capacity to ring-fence 
capital and liquidity. Therefore, ending ring-fencing should be a priority at least on 
par with creating the EDIS. The next section takes a closer look at this issue. 
2 For a more detailed description of the linkages at work in the doom loop, see SCHNABEL 
Isabel and VERON Nicolas, “Completing Europe’s banking union means breaking the bank- 
sovereign vicious circle”, Bruegel, May 2018.
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3 What is ring-fencing and how does it affect 
the Banking Union?
Ring-fencing can take many forms, but essentially amounts to restrictions on 
transfers of capital and liquidity across national borders within regionally- or in-
ternationally-active banking groups. In other words, ring-fencing occurs when the 
regulator of a specific jurisdiction requires that banks operating on its territory 
maintain a minimum amount of capital or liquid assets locally, even if these banks 
already hold capital and liquidity dedicated to the same purposes at the central/
consolidated level. Ring-fencing requirements are usually imposed on the subsid-
iaries of a banking group located overseas, by the legislator or regulator of the 
“host country”. They can be imposed during a crisis, or when there is none. 
The specific circumstances that lead a host country to ring-fence during a crisis 
vary, but ring-fencing when there is no such event generally stems from the host 
country’s desire to protect itself ex-ante against “walk away risk”, i.e. the risk that 
foreign subsidiaries operating on its territory would run into trouble and that the 
mother company would “walk away”, leaving its subsidiary to fail. In other words, 
ring-fencing is rooted in a lack of trust that cross-border banks can be wound 
down in an orderly way – one that does not leave the host country and its taxpay-
ers footing the bill. It is also rooted in a lack of trust that policymakers of various 
jurisdictions can cooperate to support such an orderly resolution. 
The reason why ring-fencing of capital and liquidity outside of crisis circumstanc-
es is so appealing is that it offers first-mover advantage: whichever jurisdiction 
ring-fences first reaps significant benefit in terms of protecting the stability of its 
local financial system. Indeed, the first jurisdiction to ring-fence not only ensures 
that foreign subsidiaries operating on its territory have local resources dedicated 
to absorbing potential losses but can also access more resources available at the 
consolidated level if needed. 
This benefit, however, is short-lived. Indeed, ring-fencing triggers a vicious cycle 
of non-cooperation which has often been compared to the “prisoner’s dilem-
ma” model in game theory: once one jurisdiction has ring-fenced and begun to 
deplete resources available at the central/consolidated level, other jurisdictions 
may start to worry whether sufficient resources would be available to support for-
eign subsidiaries active on their territory in case of a crisis, and may respond with 
ring-fencing as well. With every new ring-fencing requirement, the risk increases 
that internationally active banking groups may find themselves unable to sup-
port a subsidiary in need. Indeed, crises and the magnitude thereof are difficult 
to predict, and it is likely that a subsidiary‘s need for financing, whether capital 
or liquidity, would be superior to the amount of locally ring-fenced resources; but 
once everyone has ring-fenced capital and liquidity in separate pools, the mother 
company simply no longer has adequate resources available centrally to support a 
subsidiary in need, nor does it have the capacity to move resources from one ring-
fenced jurisdiction to another. This affects financial stability and ultimately leaves 
all participants worse off. The diagram below illustrates this dynamic3. 
3 For a similar description of ring-fencing and the sub-optimal outcome it generates, see 
ERVIN Wilson, “The Risky Business of Ring-Fencing”, working paper, December 2017.
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Ring-fencing within the Eurozone is particularly problematic. Beyond the reasons 
just described, it actively discourages private sector risk-sharing. In fact, ring-fenc-
ing is an important contributing factor of the so-called “great retrenchment”, i.e. 
the reduction of European banks’ cross-border claims observed since the crisis, 
in particular within the Eurozone. Indeed, how can banks be expected to devel-
op their network of subsidiaries across other Eurozone non-domestic markets, 
or lend to other Eurozone banks, if this leads to higher capital and liquidity re-
quirements? If they cannot so much as develop their own network of subsidiaries, 
helping them understand the nature and needs of non-domestic Eurozone mar-
kets, how can they be expected to engage even deeper in cross-border integration 
through non-domestic mergers and acquisitions? Since 2008, the proportion of in-
terbank cross-border lending in the Eurozone has decreased, in favor of interbank 
domestic lending: interbank cross-border loans within the Eurozone accounted 
for roughly 24% of total interbank EU loan activity in 2008, versus roughly 15% in 
20184. This, of course, makes it difficult to develop the kind of diversification need-
ed to truly break the nexus between banks, their sovereign state and their domes-
tic economies. By hindering the “one currency, one market” dynamic discussed in 
section 1 that is key to the survival of the Euro, ring-fencing runs counter to what 
the Banking Union seeks to achieve. Two symptomatic cases of ring-fencing in the 
Eurozone are described below.
The first example pertains to liquidity ring-fencing and the large exposures frame-
work. The large exposures framework seeks to set prudent limits to bank lending 
 
4 Indicators of financial integration in the Euro area, ECB, January 2020.
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to a single counterparty. It was established in 2013 through the Capital Require-
ments Regulation (CRR), which means that it applies directly to all Eurozone Mem-
ber States. However, intra-group lending – i.e. lending from, say, a French banking 
group to one of its subsidiaries incorporated in Italy – represents a significant por-
tion of cross-border activity in the Eurozone, so having the large exposures require-
ment apply both at the consolidated and sub-consolidated levels in the Eurozone 
would strongly impair the free flow of liquidity. To avoid this, the CRR contains dis-
positions waiving the application of the large exposure requirement at the Euro-
zone intragroup level. The problem is that the CRR did not create a straightforward 
waiver, but a dual-regime in the form of concurrent “options”, opening the door to 
ring-fencing. In EU law, an option refers to a case where the competent authority 
(in this case, the ECB/SSM) or Member States are given a choice on how to comply 
with a certain provision of EU law. 
The two concurrent options regarding the large exposures regime are as follows: 
•	 On the one hand, the CRR contains an article5 that gives the “competent author-
ity” – i.e. the ECB/SSM – power to waive the application of the large exposures 
requirement at the intragroup level of Eurozone banks.
•	 On the other hand, the CRR contains another article6 that gives Member States’ 
legislative authorities the power to waive – or only partially waive – the appli-
cation of this requirement. This option is available to Member States until 2028. 
The ECB exercised its option liberally: in 2016, it published a Regulation on the 
exercise of options available in EU law, supporting the exemption of intragroup 
exposures on certain conditions, as required by the CRR7. However, this stance has 
been overruled by several Member States of the Eurozone, that chose to grant a 
partial exemption only (e.g. Belgium, Germany), or to condition an exemption on 
qualitative requirements that are more or less strict8. Understanding the specific 
circumstances that led these Member States to make this decision – beyond per-
haps a fundamental lack of trust in the robustness of the Banking Union and a 
political choice to opt for stronger national control – would require more in-depth 
analysis, given the differences in these Member States’ banking sectors, and the 
different experiences these Member States have had of the crisis. 
This liquidity ring-fencing effect is compounded by another regulatory require-
ment, namely the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As with the large exposures re-
quirement, EU law requires that the LCR be met by all of a banking group’s entities, 
including its Euro-area located subsidiaries, unless a banking group applies for a 
waiver (that can be granted by the ECB on certain conditions). However, because 
of the strong liquidity constraint that the large exposures requirement creates, 
Eurozone banking groups do not have any incentive to apply for the available LCR 
waiver. In the words of Giovanni Bassani, who wrote an extensive analysis of this 
 
5 Capital Requirements Regulation, European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2013, article 400(2)(c).
6 Capital Requirements Regulation, European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2013, article 493(3)(c)
7 Regulation of the ECB on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law, ECB, 
March 2016.
8 Overview of options and discretions set out in Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 
N° 575/2013, European Banking Authority, 2018.
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complex legal subject: “the apparent conflict between the conditions for granting 
a cross-border liquidity waiver and the other prudential requirements (in particu-
lar the intragroup large exposures exemption) lead, almost unavoidably, to super-
visory ring-fencing within a Member State preventing the establishment of a truly 
European prudential supervisory jurisdiction”9. In addition, the ECB took a prudent 
stance with regards to the LCR waiver: for subsidiaries that are deemed significant, 
only 25% of the liquidity requirements created by the LCR can be waived10. This 
also discourages banking groups from requesting an LCR waiver from the ECB.
This continued application of the LCR at the intragroup level is highly problematic: 
fundamentally, duplicating liquidity requirements at the sub-consolidated level 
is inefficient as discussed above. In addition, the design of the LCR itself inhibits 
inter-bank lending, and thus bottom-up financial integration in the Eurozone and 
private risk-sharing11. The ECB estimated in 2018 that up to €130bn of liquidity was 
locked in cross-border subsidiaries of systemic Eurozone banks as a result of this12. 
The internal minimum required eligible liabilities – or internal MREL – is a second 
example of ring-fencing, this time pertaining to capital. The issue here is more 
straightforward. Simply put, in a true Banking Union with harmonized resolution, 
Eurozone banking groups operating on a cross-border basis should not have to 
hold capital dedicated to resolution purposes at the sub-consolidated level, as is 
currently the case; this, of course, is an instance of capital ring-fencing. Should a 
financial institution opt for a centralized resolution strategy, holding capital for 
resolution purposes on a consolidated basis should suffice. 
4 Policy recommendations
The following three actions should be prioritized in order to improve the state of 
the Banking Union:
1. The European Commission should propose an amendment to the Capital Re-
quirements Regulation so as to modify the design of the LCR. Specifically, the 
Regulation should allow the expected repayment of cross-border interbank lo-
ans in the Eurozone to count, at least partially, as an expected inflow. Eurozone 
banks would be incentivized to lend to one another if this activity didn’t engen-
der extra liquidity buffers.
9 BASSANI Giovanni, The Legal Framework Applicable to the Single Supervisory Mechanism: 
Tapestry or Patchwork?, Kluwer Law International, February 2019. The Chair of the Supervi-
sory Board of the ECB summarized this issue in similar terms; see NOUY Danièle, Questions 
for Eurofi Newsletter, ECB, April 2018.
10 ECB Guide on options and discretions available in Union law, ECB, November 2016. 
11 The EU version of the LCR (the LCR is a standard that was designed by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, but its transposition may vary from one jurisdiction to another) 
strongly discourages cross-border interbank lending because when a bank lends to another 
bank on a cross-border basis with expected repayment under thirty days, the loan cannot 
count, for the lending bank, as an expected inflow. 
12 “The Benefits of European Supervision”, speech by Mario Draghi at the ACPR Conference on 
Financial Supervision Paris, September 2018.
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2. The ECB should review its policy stance regarding the LCR waiver for signifi-
cant subsidiaries and increase it beyond 25%. This course of action, now under 
consideration by the ECB, could incentivize banks to apply for the waiver and 
encourage movement of liquidity across the Eurozone.
3. Fundamentally, however, what is required is a political leap of faith from Euro-
zone Member States, where they would collectively and concomitantly agree 
to let go of remaining discretionary powers to ring-fence. Concretely, this 
would mean that national legislators of Eurozone Member States review pro-
visions pertaining to the large exposures framework, whenever those override 
the SSM’s policy stance as discussed in section 2. In addition, the co-legislators 
should change internal MREL requirements and its pre-positioning within Eu-
rozone subsidiaries. These could be good starting points; as discussed, there 
are other instances of ring-fencing, so these recommendations are necessary 
but far from sufficient to strengthen single supervision and resolution in the 
Eurozone. 
More generally and in light of the above, the focus on the EDIS appears excessive. 
Undoubtedly, establishing the EDIS is essential and much progress is still needed 
on that front. However, focusing on the matter of ring-fencing is also required. It 
would therefore be helpful for policy discussions to continue to ask another hard 
question, namely: are Member States of the Eurozone truly committed to single 
supervision and resolution in the first place?
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